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Abstract
In this paper we model the formation of directed communication networks. A
directed communication network is represented by a directed graph. Firstly, we
study an allocation rule satisfying two appealing properties, component e±ciency
and directed fairness. We show that such an allocation rule exists if and only if we
restrict ourselves to a class of directed graphs that naturally comes to the fore in
the setting of hierarchical structures. Subsequently, we discuss several possibilities
to model the formation of directed communication networks and provide some
preliminary results.
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Networks play an important role in relationships and interaction between economic
agents. A relationship between individuals allows for a variety of interpretations. It
can, for example, represent communication possibilities, information transmission, or a
trade relation. In the organization of a ¯rm, the relationships that jointly form a network
might represent the formal °ow of information between individuals or it can represent the
hierarchical structure of a ¯rm. The position of an individual in a network will usually
in°uence his productivity. Consequently, the architecture of the internal relationships
within a group of economic agents may a®ect the joint productivity of these agents.
The game-theoretical analysis of networks was initiated by Myerson (1977). He as-
sumes that the joint pro¯ts that can be obtained by a group of players depends on its
connected components only and not on the speci¯c architectures of these components.
The possibilities to cooperate with each other are modeled by means of an undirected
graph, whereas the economic possibilities of the players, apart from the restricted pos-
sibilities to cooperate, are captured in a cooperative game with transferable utilities.
Myerson (1977) focuses on the issue how joint pro¯ts should be divided and proposes
that an allocation rule should be used that satis¯es two appealing properties. Firstly, it
should be e±cient in the sense that pro¯ts that can be ascribed to a connected group
of agents should be divided between the members of this group. Secondly, the division
should be fair in the sense that an additional relation between two players should have
the same cardinal e®ects on the payo®s that are attributed to the players that are in-
volved in this relationship. The main result of Myerson (1977) states that the division
of joint pro¯ts in a manner that satis¯es these two properties is unique determined.
The framework of Myerson (1977), i.e., a cooperative game in conjunction with an
undirected graph, is usually called a communication situation. These situations have
received a considerable amount of attention since. Borm et al. (1992) and Hamiache
(1999) focus on alternative allocation rules. Aumann and Myerson (1988) were the ¯rst
to deal with the formation of networks in this setting. They introduced a model in which
relationships between agents are formed sequentially. Their model has subsequently
been studied by Feinberg (1998) and Slikker and Norde (2000). Both papers focus
on incomplete stable structures. Qin (1996) and Dutta et al. (1998) on the other hand
study a model, introduced by Myerson (1991), in which bilateral relationships are formed
simultaneously rather than sequentially. For a survey of the literature on communication
situations we refer to van den Nouweland (1993) and Slikker (2000).
Recently, a growing interest in the analysis of social and economic networks can be
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observed. Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) introduced a model that is close to the com-
munication situations of Myerson (1977). Their model additionally allows for in°uence
of the architecture of a connected group of players on their joint pro¯tability. In their
analysis, Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) focus on the con°ict between e±ciency and sta-
bility, showing that a stable network that is e±cient does not always exist. The con°ict
between e±ciency and stability is further investigated by Dutta and Mutuswami (1997).
Watts (1997) considers a dynamic model of network formation, thereby restricting the
analysis to a stylized model that was introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), the
connections model. Johnson and Gilles (1999) also study the connections model, sup-
plemented with a spatial cost topology. They investigate the pairwise stable networks
and the subgame perfect implementation of pairwise stable and e±cient networks.
In the models described so far, relations between agents are assumed to be symmetric.
Some situations, for example the hierarchical structure of a ¯rm, demand for modeling
for a distinction between the two agents that are involved in a relation. Situations
with asymmetric bilateral relations are sometimes modeled by means of directed graphs.
Cooperative situations with asymmetric relations between players have been studied
by Gilles et al. (1992), Derks and Gilles (1995), van den Brink and Gilles (1996), and
Gilles and Owen (1999). In these papers, a cooperation structure is interpreted as a
permission structure, where a player can fully participate in a cooperative situation if
he has permission by one or all of his superiors. Van den Brink and Gilles (1994) and
van den Brink and Borm (1995) study these cooperation structures from a di®erent point
of view. Rather than an analysis of the division of cooperative gains, they provide two
approaches to measure social power in hierarchically structured populations.
The formation of asymmetric relations between players is the subject of study in Bala
and Goyal (2000). In their approach the costs of establishing a cooperation relation are
incurred by the person who initiates this link. Two interpretations of such a cooperation
relation are considered. Firstly, a cooperation relation represents one-way communica-
tion, meaning that the person who establishes a directed communication relation has
access to the information of the player with whom he forms a directed communica-
tion relation, but not vice-versa. Hence, in this model a relation between two players
is asymmetric. Secondly, Bala and Goyal (2000) consider two-way communication, in
which both players involved in a directed communication relation have access to each
other's information. Bala and Goyal (2000) characterize the equilibrium networks in
these models and subsequently take a dynamic approach to the formation of networks.
They derive that equilibrium networks emerge rapidly. These models appear to have
simple architectures and are often socially e±cient. Jackson (1999) also studies the
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formation of asymmetric communication networks. He focuses on the relation between
stability and e±ciency.
In this paper we follow Bala and Goyal (2000) in assuming that relations between
two players are asymmetric. We assume that the economic possibilities of the players
are captured in a directed reward function that assigns a value to every directed graph
on a ¯xed set of agents. We ¯rst focus on allocation rules for situations where the
economic possibilities are described by such a reward function and a speci¯c network
has formed. Here we want to follow Myerson (1977) as close as possible, but we want
to take into account the asymmetry of a relation between two players. We show that
there exists an allocation rule that satis¯es an e±ciency property and a fairness property,
which takes into account these asymmetries in a relation, if and only if the players can
be partitioned in hierarchical classes. Subsequently, we introduce and discuss several
models that represent the formation of hierarchical structures.
In considering asymmetric communication relations between the agents we distinguish
between the initiator of a relation and the receiver. The allocation rule described above
treats an initiator and a receiver asymmetrically. This asymmetry is captured in a
parameter ® ¸ 1, where benchmark parameter ® = 1 stands for symmetric treatment
of initiator and receiver in a directed communication relation. With respect to the
model of Bala and Goyal (2000), ® = 1 corresponds to two-way communication. One-
way communication as described in Bala and Goyal (2000) would require analysis of ®
'equal' to in¯nity, representing that bene¯ts of a relation accrue solely to the initiator of
a link. We will mainly concentrate on the intermediate cases, i.e., 1 < ® <1.
Several major theories provide di®erent explanations of why ¯rms exist and employees
submit themselves to an incomplete contract in their relation with an employer. The
employer can be seen as the initiator and the employee as the receiver of a relation
between them. Coase (1937) considers an employment relation to be a relationship in
which the employer has full control of the employee and can order him around at will.
In the agency literature this is replaced by a more subtle relation. Here, the employer is
called principal and the employee his agent. The employer has an information de¯cit due
to adverse selection and/or moral hazard problems. He does not have complete control
of the agent. Subsequently, the literature turns to the design of an optimal employment
contract between employer and employee. Such a contract usually contains (minimal)
incentives for the agent to do his work properly. In the asset approach this viewpoint
is weakened further. The employer can essentially only deny the employee access to the
productive assets of the ¯rm. All residual rights result from the fundamental right to
'veto' the employee. In any of these interpretations it does not become clear why a ¯rm
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should have a hierarchical organization structure. The main theorem of this paper deals
with this issue. This theorem states that if the initiator of a directed communication
relation (possibly a hierarchical relation) expects a higher marginal in°uence from an
additional relation on his payo®, then this can only be implemented within networks in
which players are divided in hierarchical classes. Hence, the asymmetry in these marginal
in°uences of directed communication relations demands for a hierarchical communication
network.
The setup of the remainder of this paper is as follows. In section 2 we provide
preliminaries with respect to directed graphs and directed reward situations. Allocation
rules are the subject of study in section 3. Finally, in section 4 we give the ¯rst impulse
to modeling the formation of asymmetric communication networks in which the consent
of both players in a directed communication relation is required for the formation of this
relation.
2 Preliminaries
A directed graph is a pair (N;A) where N = f1; : : : ; ng is a set of vertices and A µ©
(i; j) j i; j 2 N ; i 6= j
ª
a set of (directed) arcs.1 The vertices can be interpreted as
players and the arcs as communication relations: an arc (i; j) states that player i is the
initiator of this directed communication relation and that player j is the receiver. The
set of all directed graphs with player set N is denoted by DGN . In case there is no
ambiguity about the set of vertices we will sometimes identify a directed graph with its
set of directed arcs. To stress the interpretation of a directed graph we will from now on
refer to (N;A) 2 DGN as a directed communication network.
A collection A of directed communication networks is called closed (under taking
inclusions) if for all A 2 A and all A0 µ A it holds that A0 2 A. In this paper we will
restrict our attention to collections of directed communication networks that are closed.
Note that the set of all directed communication networks is closed as is, for example,
the set of all bipartite directed graphs, which are structures that contain only directed
arcs from a subset of the player set, the set of initiators, to its complement, the set of
receivers. We remark that in a bipartite graph it is possible that a player is not involved
in any directed communication relation.
The communication relations between players have another interpretation as well:
since the only relations between players are directed communication relations, cooper-
1S µ T denotes that S is a subset of T. S ½ T denotes that S is a strict subset of T .
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ation between players is via these relations only. This restriction in cooperation be-
tween the players results for a ¯xed directed communication network A in a partition
of the player set. Two players i and j are connected if i = j or the players are con-
nected, either directly, i.e., (i; j) 2 A or (j; i) 2 A, or indirectly, i.e., there exists a path
(x1; e1; x2; : : : ; xk¡1; ek¡1; xk), k ¸ 3, with x1 = i, xk = j, and for all l 2 f1; : : : ; k¡ 1g it
holds that el 2 f(xl; xl+1); (xl+1; xl)g and el 2 A. Two players are in the same partition
element if and only if they are connected. The resulting partition is denoted by N=A.
For any R µ N , the partition into components in (R;A(R)) is denoted by R=A, where
A(R) = f(i; j) 2 A j fi; jg µ Rg. Though an arc (i; j) 2 A is directed, it represents a
fully developed communication link. Hence, connectedness, as de¯ned above, is based
on arbitrary communication paths, without paying attention to the direction of the links
in a path. We remark that A(R) sometimes refers to directed communication network
(N;A(R)) and sometimes to directed communication network (R;A(R)).











r 2 f1; : : : ; l ¡ 1g j er = (xr; xr+1)
o¯̄
¯:
Finally, a cycle is a path P = (x1; e1; x2; : : : ; el¡1; xl) with x1 = xl and x1; : : : ; xl¡1 all
distinct points.
Let A µ DGN be a closed set of directed communication networks. A directed reward
function r on A is a function r : A ! IR that assigns a real number to every directed
communication network A 2 A. The value r(A) represents the pro¯t that can be ob-
tained by all players together if they cooperate according to this directed communication
network. Throughout this paper we assume that r(;) = 0, which states that if there are
no relations between the players then no pro¯t can be made. Furthermore, we assume




r(A(C)) for all A 2 A:
A triple (N; r;A) with r a directed reward function on A and A 2 A will be called a
directed reward situation on A. Denote the set of all directed reward situations with
player set N on A by DRSN;A.
An allocation rule ° for directed reward situations assigns a vector °(N; r;A) 2 IRN
to every directed reward situation (N; r; A) in a class of directed reward situations. If
there is no ambiguity about the underlying player set and the directed reward function
we sometimes refer to °(A) instead of °(N; r;A).
A cooperative game is a pair (N; v), where N = f1; : : : ; ng denotes the set of players
and v : 2N ! IR the characteristic function, with v(;) = 0. Every game (N; v) can be
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written in a unique way as a linear combination of unanimity games (N;uR)RµN , where
uR(T ) = 1 if R µ T and uR(T ) = 0 otherwise, i.e., v =
P
RµN ¸R(v)uR. In case there
is no ambiguity about the underlying game we simply write ¸R instead of ¸R(v). The





jRj for all i 2 N:
Weighted Shapley values can be described similarly. Let w 2 IRN++ and for all R µ N
de¯ne wR =
P
i2R wi. The weighted Shapley value with weights w of a game (cf. Kalai
and Samet (1988)) is then described by





¸R for all i 2 N:
We will sometimes refer to the weighted Shapley value with weights w as the w-Shapley
value.
A game in strategic form will be denoted by ¡ = (N ; (Xi)i2N ; (¼i)i2N), where N =
f1; : : : ; ng denotes the player set, Xi the strategy space of player i 2 N , and ¼ = (¼i)i2N
the payo® function which assigns to every strategy-tuple x = (xi)i2N 2
Q
i2N Xi = X a
vector in IRN . For notational convenience we write x¡i = (xl)l2Nnfig, x¡ij = (xl)l2Nnfi;jg,
and xR = (xl)l2R.
Monderer and Shapley (1996) formally de¯ned the class of weighted potential games.
For any w 2 IRN++ the function Pw :
Q
i2N Xi ! IR is called a w-potential for ¡ if for
every i 2 N , every x 2 X, and every ti 2 Xi it holds that
¼i(xi; x¡i)¡ ¼i(ti; x¡i) = wi (Pw(xi; x¡i)¡ Pw(ti; x¡i)) : (1)
The game ¡ is called a w-potential game if it admits a w-potential. The game ¡ is called
a weighted potential game if it is a w-potential game for some w 2 IRN++.
The following set of collections of cooperative games forms the basis for a represen-
tation theorem of weighted potential games.
GN;X :=
n




The representation theorem of Slikker et al. (2000) describes a relation between weighted
potential games and weighted Shapley values of cooperative games.2
2Ui (2000) provides a similar theorem for (unweighted) potential games in terms of Shapley values.
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Theorem 2.1 Let ¡ = (N ; (Xi)i2N ; (¼i)i2N) be a game in strategic form. ¡ is a w-
potential game if and only if there exists f(N; vx)gx2X 2 GN;X such that
¼i(x) = ©
w
i (vx) for all i 2 N and all x 2 X: (3)
Proof: See Slikker et al. (2000). 2
3 Allocation rules
In this section we study allocation rules for directed reward situations. Besides an
e±ciency requirement we demand that an allocation rule treats directed communication
relations symmetric. However, we would like the allocation rule to distinguish between
the two players forming a directed communication relation. These two features are
captured in the property directed fairness. We show that in general there is no allocation
rule that satis¯es the e±ciency requirement and directed fairness. We then proceed in
two di®erent directions. Firstly, we study some alternative fairness principle that is more
widely applicable but less appealing in the setting of this paper. Secondly, we study the
necessary and su±cient conditions on a set of directed communication networks to ensure
existence of an allocation rule satisfying the e±ciency requirement and directed fairness.
Let A µ DGN be a closed collection of directed graphs. Consider the following
property for an allocation rule ° on DRSN;A:
Component e±ciency (CE): For all directed reward situations (N; r; A) 2 DRSN;A
and all C 2 N=A it holds that
X
i2C
°i(N; r;A) = r(A(C)): (4)
Furthermore, for any ® ¸ 1 consider the following property for an allocation rule ° on
DRSN;A:
®-Directed fairness (®-DF): For all directed reward situations (N; r; A) 2 DRSN;A
and all i; j 2 N with (i; j) 2 A it holds that
°i(N; r; A)¡ °i(N; r;Anf(i; j)g) = ®
h




Component e±ciency states that the pro¯ts of a component should be divided among
the players in this component. The property ®-directed fairness states that, though the
change in payo® for the initiator (i) and the receiver (j) might be di®erent, it holds
that if one of the di®erences is non-zero then the ratio between the two di®erences is the
same for all directed communication relations. This constant ratio is denoted by ® and
represents the di®erence between an initiator and a receiver in a directed communication
relation. If ® = 1 then the initiator and the receiver experience the same in°uence of
an additional link. We will mainly restrict ourselves to ® > 1. This states that an
initiator experiences a greater in°uence of an additional link than a receiver. We say
that an allocation rule satis¯es directed fairness if this allocation rule satis¯es ®-directed
fairness, for some ® > 1. We note that the mathematical analysis that follows would
not change if we consider ® 2 (0; 1), but such a weight is in contrast with the natural
assumption that an initiator experiences a greater in°uence of an additional link than a
receiver. Furthermore, we remark that the distinction between an initiator and a receiver
is not determined a priori. In fact, we do not even exclude that both (i; j) and (j; i)
belong to a directed communication network.
The following example shows that in general there is no allocation rule that satis¯es
component e±ciency and ®-directed fairness with ® > 1.
Example 3.1 Let N = f1; 2; 3g, A the set of all subsets of A¤ = f(1; 2); (2; 3); (3; 1)g,
and r the directed reward function on A with r(f(1; 2); (2; 3); (3; 1)g) = 1 and r(A) = 0
otherwise. Suppose ° is an allocation rule that satis¯es CE and ®-DF. We will show
that it must hold that ® = 1.
Firstly, by CE it follows that °i(N; r; ;) = 0 for all i 2 N . Subsequently, consider A =
f(j; k)g. Then the remaining player i receives 0 by CE. Furthermore, °j(N; r; f(j; k)g) =
®
h
°k(N; r; f(j; k)g)
i
by ®-DF. Using CE it then follows for the payo®s of players j and
k that °j(N; r; f(j; k)g) = °k(N; r; f(j; k)g) = 0. With similar arguments we ¯nd that
for all A ½ A¤ and all i 2 f1; 2; 3g it holds that °i(N; r;A) = 0.
Subsequently, consider A¤. By ®-DF it follows that
°1(N; r;A
¤)¡ °1(N; r;A¤nf(1; 2)g) = ®
h
°2(N; r; A




¤)¡ °2(N; r;A¤nf(2; 3)g) = ®
h
°3(N; r; A




¤)¡ °3(N; r;A¤nf(3; 1)g) = ®
h
°1(N; r; A




Using that °i(N; r;A) = 0 for all A ½ A¤ and all i 2 N we ¯nd
°1(N; r; A






Hence, it follows that ® = 1 or °1(N; r; A
¤) = 0. The last possibility would im-
ply that
P
i2N °i(N; r; A
¤) = 0, since °2(N; r; A
¤) = ®2°1(N; r;A
¤) and °3(N; r; A
¤) =
®°1(N; r;A
¤), contradicting CE. We conclude that ® = 1 should hold, otherwise there is
no allocation rule that satis¯es ®-directed fairness and component e±ciency. 3
So, in general there exists no allocation rule that satis¯es CE and ®-DF for some
® > 1. However, for several classes of directed graphs that are interesting in analyzing
directed communication networks there exists an allocation rule satisfying these prop-
erties. These classes are studied in section 3.2. Before that, in section 3.1 we study an
alternative fairness-criterion.
3.1 Allocation rules with ¯xed weights
In this section we introduce and study weighted allocation rules, called weighted directed
communication values. We show that these values can be characterized by two properties,
component e±ciency and w-fairness.
Before we introduce these allocation rules we need some additional notation. Let A
be a closed collection of directed communication networks. For every directed reward
situation (N; r; A) 2 DRSN;A de¯ne an associated cooperative game (N; vr;A) as follows:
vr;A(T ) = r(A(T )) for all T µ N:
Then the directed communication value ± of directed reward situation (N; r;A) 2 DRSN;A
is de¯ned by
±(N; r;A) = ©(N; vr;A);
where © denotes the Shapley value.
Similarly, the weighted directed communication value ±w of directed reward situation
(N; r; A) 2 DRSN;A with weights w 2 IRN++ is de¯ned by
±w(N; r;A) = ©w(N; vr;A);
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where ©w denotes the w-Shapley value. Note that ± = ±w with w = (1; 1; : : : ; 1). We
will sometimes refer to the weighted directed communication value with weights w as
the w-directed communication value.
We will characterize weighted directed communication values by two properties, com-
ponent e±ciency and an alternative fairness criterion. Therefore, for all w 2 IRN++ con-
sider the following property for an allocation rule on DRSN;A:
w-Fairness (w-F): For all directed reward situations (N; r; A) 2 DRSN;A, and all
(i; j) 2 A it holds that
°i(N; r; A)¡ °i(N; r; Anf(i; j)g)
wi
=
°j(N; r;A)¡ °j(N; r; Anf(i; j)g)
wj
:
So, w-fairness states that the change in payo® for two players forming an additional
directed communication relation is proportional to their weights. Note that although at
¯rst sight this property may seem similar to ®-directed fairness, there is a big di®erence:
the weights in w-fairness are determined by the nature of the players, whereas in ®-
directed fairness the weights are determined by the nature of the relation between the
two players. We remark that w-fairness with w = (1; : : : ; 1) coincides with ®-directed
fairness with ® = 1.
The following lemma shows that the w-directed communication value satis¯es the
two properties component e±ciency and w-fairness. In the proof we use some results of
Kalai and Samet (1988). In this paper, it is shown that the w-Shapley value satis¯es the
dummy property, additivity, and partnership consistency. The dummy property states
that ©wi (N; v) = v(fig) for all (N; v) with v(S [ fig) = v(S) + v(fig) for all S µ Nnfig.
Additivity states that ©w(N; v + z) = ©w(N; v) + ©w(N; z) for all cooperative games
(N; v) and (N; z). To describe partnership consistency we need the notion of partnership.
A coalition S µ N is a partnership in (N; v) if for all T ½ S and all R µ NnS,
v(R [ T ) = v(R). Partnership consistency of ©w states that for every partnership S in
(N; v) it holds that




S (v) uS) ; for every i 2 S;





In the following lemma we show that the w-directed communication value satis¯es
component e±ciency and w-fairness.
Lemma 3.1 Let w 2 IRN++. The w-directed communication value, ±w, satis¯es compo-
nent e±ciency and w-fairness on DRSN;A.
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Proof: First we will show that ±w satis¯es component e±ciency. Let (N; r;A) 2 DRSN;A
and C a component of (N;A). We de¯ne two cooperative games (N; vC) and (N; vNnC).
For all T µ N let
vC(T ) := r(A(T \ C));
vNnC(T ) := r(A(TnC)):
Since C is a component of (N;A) and r is component additive it holds that vr;A =
vC + vNnC . Since all i 2 C are dummy players in the game (N; vNnC), we conclude, from
the dummy player property of the w-Shapley value, that ©wi (v
NnC) = 0 for all i 2 C. In
the same way we ¯nd for all i 2 NnC that ©wi (vC) = 0. Using this and the additivity of





















C) = vC(N) = r(A(C));
where the fourth equality follows from the e±ciency of the w-Shapley value.
Secondly, we will show that the w-directed communication value satis¯es w-fairness.
Let (N; r; A) 2 DRSN;A and (i; j) 2 A. De¯ne A0 := Anf(i; j)g and v0 := vr;A ¡ vr;A0 .
For all T µ N with fi; jg 6µ T we then have
v0(T ) = r(A(T ))¡ r(A0(T )) = 0
since A(T ) = A0(T ). This means that fi; jg is a partnership in v0. From partnership







































From this we ¯nd















where the ¯rst and third equalities follow from the de¯nition of the game (N; v0) and the
additivity of the w-Shapley values. Hence, ±w satis¯es w-fairness. 2
Subsequently, we show that there exists at most one allocation rule on DRSN;A that
satis¯es component e±ciency and w-fairness.
Lemma 3.2 Let w 2 IRN++. There is at most one allocation rule on DRSN;A that satis¯es
component e±ciency and w-fairness.
Proof: Suppose there are two rules °1 and °2 that satisfy component e±ciency and w-
fairness. We will show that °1 coincides with °2 on DRSN;A by induction to the number
of arcs.
Firstly, let (N; r; A) 2 DRSN;A be a directed reward situation with jAj = 0. Then it
follows directly by component e±ciency that °1(N; r; A) = °2(N; r;A).
Secondly, let p ¸ 1 and suppose that °1(N; r;A) = °2(N; r; A) for all directed reward
situations in DRSN;A with jAj · p ¡ 1. Let (N; r; A) 2 DRSN;A be a directed reward










°1j (A)¡ °1j (Anf(i; j)g)
¢
:
Using this, the induction hypothesis, and the w-fairness of °2 respectively, we ¯nd
wj°
1
i (A)¡ wi°1j (A) = wj°1i (Anf(i; j)g)¡ wi°1j (Anf(i; j)g)
= wj°
2
i (Anf(i; j)g)¡ wi°2j (Anf(i; j)g)
= wj°
2
i (A)¡ wi°2j (A):
So
°1i (A)¡ °2i (A)
wi
=
°1j (A)¡ °2j (A)
wj
:
This expression is valid for all pairs fi; jg with (i; j) 2 A or (j; i) 2 A. Hence, it is also
valid for all pairs fs; tg that are in the same component.














Let d := 1
wi
(°1i (A)¡ °2i (A)). Then for all j 2 C : °1j (A) ¡ °2j (A) = wjd. Component


















Since w 2 IRN++ it follows that d = 0. Since i was chosen arbitrarily, we conclude that
°1(A) = °2(A).
This completes the proof. 2
Combining the two lemmas above, the following theorem follows directly.
Theorem 3.1 Let w 2 IRN++. The w-directed communication value is the unique allo-
cation rule on DRSN;A that satis¯es component e±ciency and w-fairness.
Proof: Follows directly from lemmas 3.1 and 3.2. 2
3.2 Directed fairness on subclasses of networks
In this section we study what conditions on the class of directed graphs are necessary
and su±cient for the existence of an allocation rule that satis¯es component e±ciency
and directed fairness.
Before we consider these conditions we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 3.3 Let ® > 1 and let A be a closed collection of directed communication
networks. There is at most one allocation rule on DRSN;A that satis¯es component
e±ciency and ®-directed fairness.
Proof: Suppose there are two rules °1 and °2 that satisfy component e±ciency and
®-directed fairness. We will show that °1 coincides with °2 on DRSN;A by induction to
the number of arcs.
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Firstly, let (N; r; A) 2 DRSN;A be a directed reward situation with jAj = 0. Then it
follows directly by component e±ciency that °1(N; r; A) = °2(N; r;A).
Secondly, let p ¸ 1 and suppose that °1(N; r;A) = °2(N; r; A) for all directed reward
situations in DRSN;A with jAj · p ¡ 1. Let (N; r; A) 2 DRSN;A be a directed reward
situation with jAj = p. Let (i; j) 2 A. From ®-directed fairness of °1 we then ¯nd
°1i (A)¡ °1i (Anf(i; j)g) = ®
¡
°1j (A)¡ °1j (Anf(i; j)g)
¢
:
Using this, the induction hypothesis, and the ®-directed fairness of °2 respectively, we
¯nd
°1i (A)¡ ®°1j (A) = °1i (Anf(i; j)g)¡ ®°1j (Anf(i; j)g)
= °2i (Anf(i; j)g)¡ ®°2j (Anf(i; j)g)
= °2i (A)¡ ®°2j (A):
So,
°1i (A)¡ °2i (A) = ®
³
°1j (A)¡ °2j (A)
´
:
This expression is valid for all pairs fi; jg with (i; j) 2 A.
Let i 2 N and let C 2 N=A be such that i 2 C. For all j 2 Cnfig there exists
at least one path from i to j. Denote an arbitrary but ¯xed path from i to j by














Now, de¯ne wCj = ®
t(Pij) for all j 2 Cnfig. Furthermore, de¯ne wCi = 1. For all j 2 C
we have ¡




°1i (A)¡ °2i (A)
¢
:
Let d = (°1i (A)¡ °2i (A)). Then for all j 2 C : °1j (A) ¡ °2j (A) = wCj d. Component


















Since wCj > 0 for all j 2 C it follows that d = 0. Since i was chosen arbitrarily, we
conclude that °1(A) = °2(A). A contradiction.
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This completes the proof. 2
Consider the following properties for a directed communication network (N;A):
Hierarchical-classes property (HCP): There exists an (ordered) partition B =
(B1; : : : ; Bm) of N such that for all (i; j) 2 A there exists k 2 f1; : : : ;m¡ 1g with
i 2 Bk+1 and j 2 Bk.
Cycle property (CP): For every cycle P = (x1; e1; x2; : : : ; xl; el; xl+1) with xl+1 = x1
it holds that t(P ) = 0.
The hierarchical-classes property states that the players can be partitioned in hi-
erarchical classes such that there exist only directed communication relations from a
hierarchical class to the hierarchical class directly below this class. Note that the class
of graphs that satisfy the hierarchical-classes property are sometimes used to represent a
hierarchical structure. Here, one can think of top-down relations between individuals in
a ¯rm. The cycle property states that every cycle in a directed communication network
contains as many arcs directed one way as it contains directed the other way.
We will say that a collection of graphs satis¯es the hierarchical-classes property (cy-
cle property) if every directed communication network in this collection satis¯es the
hierarchical-classes property (cycle property). Note that if a directed communication
network satis¯es the hierarchical-classes property (cycle property) then all subgraphs
of this directed communication network satisfy the hierarchical-classes property (cycle
property) as well.
The following lemma shows that the hierarchical-classes property and the cycle prop-
erty are equivalent.
Lemma 3.4 Let (N;A) 2 DGN be a directed communication network. Then (N;A)
satis¯es the hierarchical-classes property if and only if (N;A) satis¯es the cycle property.
Proof: Firstly, we show the if-part. Suppose (N;A) satis¯es the cycle property. We
will assign a number to each vertex. Let C 2 N=A be a component in the directed
communication network (N;A). Let i 2 C be ¯xed. Set pCi = 0. For all j 2 Cnfig
consider an arbitrary but ¯xed path from i to j, Pij = (x1; e1; x2; : : : ; el¡1; xl) with
x1 = i and xl = j. De¯ne
pCj = t(Pij):
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By CP it follows that pCj is independent of the choice of a speci¯c path between i and
j. Furthermore, note that this construction implies that for all a; b 2 C it holds that
if (a; b) 2 A then pCa = pCb + 1. In this way pCj is constructed for all C 2 N=A and all
j 2 C. Subsequently, de¯ne
BCk = fj 2 C j pCj ¡min
r2C
pCr + 1 = kg








Then, for all a; b 2 N it holds that if (a; b) 2 A and a 2 BCk+1 for some C 2 N=A
and k 2 f1; : : : ;m¤ ¡ 1g then b 2 BCk since pCa = pCb + 1. Now, (B1; : : : ; Bm¤) with
Bk = [C2N=ABCk for all k 2 f1; : : : ;m¤g is an ordered partition of N such that for all
(r; t) 2 A there exists k 2 f1; : : : ;m¤ ¡ 1g with r 2 Bk+1 and t 2 Bk. We conclude that
(N;A) satis¯es the hierarchical-classes property.
It remains to show the only-if-part. Suppose (N;A) satis¯es the hierarchical-classes
property. Then there exists an ordered partition (B1; : : : ; Bm) of N such that for all
(i; j) 2 A there exists k 2 f1; : : : ;m ¡ 1g with i 2 Bk+1 and j 2 Bk. Consider a cycle
(x1; e1; x2; : : : ; xl; el; xl+1), with x1 = xl+1. For every r 2 f1; : : : ; lg with xr 2 Bk it holds
that if er = (xr; xr+1) then xr+1 2 Bk¡1 and if er = (xr+1; xr) then xr+1 2 Bk+1. Since
x1 and xl+1 coincide, they belong to the same partition element implying that
jfr 2 f1; : : : ; lg j er = (xr; xr+1)gj = jfr 2 f1; : : : ; lg j er = (xr+1; xr)gj:
This completes the proof. 2
In the following lemma we will show that there exists an allocation rule that satis¯es
component e±ciency and ®-directed fairness with ® > 1 on any closed collection of
graphs satisfying the hierarchical-classes property. Therefore, we need some additional
notation. For every (N;A) that satis¯es the hierarchical-classes property denote by
B(A) = (BA1 ; : : : ; BAm) an arbitrary but ¯xed partition of the player set such that for
all (i; j) 2 A there exists k 2 f1; : : : ;m ¡ 1g with i 2 BAk+1 and j 2 BAk . We remark
that B(A) is unique if N=A = 1. Furthermore, de¯ne the weight vector wA® 2 IRN++ by
(wA® )i = ®
k for all i 2 N , where k is such that i 2 BAk .
Lemma 3.5 Let ® > 1, let (N;A) be a directed communication network that satis-
¯es the hierarchical-classes property, and let A = fA0 j A0 µ Ag. Then ±wA® satis¯es
component e±ciency and ®-directed fairness on DRSN;A.
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Proof: It follows from theorem 3.1 that ±w
A
® satis¯es component e±ciency. It remains to
show that ±w
A
® satis¯es ®-directed fairness. From theorem 3.1 it follows that ±w
A
® satis¯es

















Since (wA® )i = ®(w
A


















® satis¯es ®-directed fairness. 2
We remark that although wA® is de¯ned by means of an arbitrary partition for which
the hierarchical-classes property is satis¯ed, it follows by lemmas 3.3 and 3.5 that the
allocation rule ±w
A
® is independent of the choice of B(A).
The following lemma states that if two allocation rules, each de¯ned on a class of
directed reward situations based on a closed collection of directed communication net-
works, both satisfy component e±ciency and ®-directed fairness then they coincide on
the intersection of these classes.
Lemma 3.6 Let ® > 1 and let A1;A2 be two closed collections of graphs that satisfy
the hierarchical-classes property. If °1 and °2 satisfy component e±ciency and ®-directed
fairness on DRSN;A1 and DRSN;A2 , respectively, then °1 and °2 coincide on DRS
N;A1\A2
Proof: Both °1 and °2 satisfy CE and ®-DF on DRS
N;A1\A2 . By lemma 3.3 it follows
that °1 and °2 coincide on DRS
N;A1\A2 . 2
The following theorem deals with arbitrary closed classes of graphs that satisfy the
hierarchical-classes property. For any collection of directed reward situations based on
such a class there is a unique allocation rule that satis¯es component e±ciency and
®-directed fairness.
Theorem 3.2 Let ® > 1 and let A be a closed collection of graphs that satis¯es the
hierarchical-classes property. Then there exists a unique allocation rule on DRSN;A that







¯ there is no A0 2 A with A ½ A0
o
:
Let r be a directed reward function on A. Let A 2 A. Choose A0 2 Amax such that
A µ A0. De¯ne
°(N; r; A) = ±w
A0
® (N; r; A):
By lemma 3.6 it follows that °(N; r;A) is independent of the choice of A0 2 Amax. Hence,
° is well-de¯ned and ° coincides with ±w
A0
® on A0 = fA j A µ A0g for all A0 2 Amax. By
lemma 3.5 it follows that ° satis¯es CE and ®-DF on DRSN;A
0
for all A0 2 Amax. We
conclude that ° satis¯es CE and ®-DF on DRSN;A.
Lemma 3.3 implies that ° is the unique allocation rule on DRSN;A that satis¯es CE
and ®-DF. 2
The following theorem shows that if a collection of directed communication networks
contains a directed communication network that does not satisfy the hierarchical-classes
property then there is no allocation rule that satis¯es component e±ciency and directed
fairness.
Theorem 3.3 Let (N;A¤) be a directed communication network that does not satisfy
the hierarchical-classes property. Let A be a closed collection of graphs with A¤ 2 A.
Then there is no allocation rule ° that satis¯es component e±ciency and ®-directed
fairness with ® > 1.
Proof: By lemma 3.4 it follows that (N;A¤) does not satisfy CP. Consider a cycle
P = (x1; e1; x2; : : : ; xl; el; xl+1) with x1 = xl+1 and t(P ) 6= 0. Denote A0 = fe1; : : : ; elg.
Consider the directed reward function r on A de¯ned by
r(A) =
(
1 if A = A0;
0 otherwise:
Suppose ° is an allocation rule on DRSN;A that satis¯es CE and ®-DF with ® > 1. Then,
with arguments similar to those in example 3.1, it follows that
°i(N; r; A) = 0 for all A ½ A0 and all i 2 N:














0) = ®t(P )°x1(N; r; A
0):
Since t(P ) 6= 0 and x1 = xl+1 it follows that ® = 1 or °x1(N; r; A0) = 0. Since ® > 1 it
follows that °x1(N; r; A
0) = 0. But then it follows by equation (6) that °xr(N; r;A
0) = 0
for all r 2 f1; : : : ; lg. This contradicts CE since fx1; : : : ; xlg is a component in (N;A0). 2
Combining theorems 3.2 and 3.3 we get the following theorem
Theorem 3.4 Let ® > 1 and let A be a closed collection of directed communication
networks. Then A satis¯es the hierarchical-classes property if and only if there exists
an allocation rule on DRSN;A that satis¯es component e±ciency and ®-directed fairness.
Moreover, if such an allocation rule exists then it is unique.
Proof: Follows directly from theorems 3.2 and 3.3. 2
The value of theorem 3.4 will be called the ®-hierarchical value and will be denoted
by h®. In case there is no ambiguity about ® this value will sometimes be called the
hierarchical value. We stress once more that a hierarchical value exists only if the
players can be partitioned in hierarchical classes for any network in the class of directed
communication networks, i.e., the collection of directed communication networks satis¯es
the hierarchical-classes property.
4 Hierarchy formation
In this section we will study several ways to model the formation of a directed communi-
cation network. We discuss several possibilities for the modeling of the strategies of the
players and the formation of a directed communication network given the strategies of the
players. We start with the description of a general model and discuss some of the prob-
lems that arise. Subsequently, we will re¯ne our model in several directions. We want
to apply the hierarchical value developed in the previous section, which is properly de-
¯ned for classes of directed communication networks that satisfy the hierarchical-classes
property. Therefore, in this section we will usually refer to a directed communication
network as a hierarchical structure. Additionally, we will sometimes call an initiator of
a hierarchical relation a boss and we will sometimes call a receiver a subordinate.
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Firstly, we describe a general model of hierarchical structure formation. Let N be a
set of players, A = DGN the collection of directed communication networks on player set
N , and r a directed reward function on A. Let ° be an allocation rule on DRSN;A. De¯ne
the hierarchy formation game ¡hf(N; r; °) determined by the tuple (N ; (Si)i2N ; (f
°
i )i2N)





i ) j s1i ; s2i µ Nnfig; s1i \ s2i = ;
o




i ), denotes the
set of players he wants to be a subordinate to (s1i ) and the set of players he wants to be
a boss of (s2i ). A strategy pro¯le s = (s1; : : : ; sn) 2
Q
i2N Si, induces a set of directed
links A(s) given by
A(s) =
©
(i; j) j i 2 s1j ; j 2 s2i
ª
:
The interpretation is that a (directed) arc is formed if and only if both players involved
in the arc are willing to form it. The payo® function f° = (f°i )i2N is then de¯ned as the
allocation rule applied to the hierarchical structure formed, i.e.,
f°(s) = °(N; r;A(s)) for all s 2 S:
In case there is no ambiguity about the underlying player set and the directed reward
function we will simply write ¡hf(°) instead of ¡hf (N; r; °). In the remainder we will
consider an arbitrary directed reward function r on DRSN;A.
Consider the following example.
Example 4.1 Let N = f1; 2; 3g and A = DGN the set of all directed graphs on player
set N . Let r be a directed reward function on A and let ° be an allocation rule. Consider
the hierarchy formation game ¡hf(N; r; °) and suppose that the players play strategies
s1 = (f2g; f3g);
s2 = (f3g; f1g);
s3 = (f1g; f2g):
According to the formation rule this results in the formation of the arcs (2; 1), (3; 2), and
(1; 3). Hence, the resulting structure does not satisfy the hierarchical-classes property. 3
Example 4.1 illustrates a problem that arises in the model ¡hf(N; r; °). Our general
model may result in (directed) cycles. According to theorem 3.1 there exists no allocation
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rule that satis¯es the properties component e±ciency and ®-directed fairness on a class
of directed communication networks that does not satisfy HCP.
There are several ways to deal with this problems. We mention a few. Firstly, one
could adjust the formation rule in the sense that if a directed cycle results, all relations
will break down or, more subtle, all relations in each component that contains a cycle
will break down. Another possibility is to break down all those links that belong to at
least one cycle only. These methods can be applied to ensure that the resulting directed
communication network satis¯es the hierarchical-classes property. Here, we will take two
di®erent approaches. In section 4.1 we analyze a model of hierarchy formation where
players are a priori partitioned in hierarchical classes. In section 4.2 we adjust the general
model of hierarchy formation by adding the choice of a hierarchical class to the strategies
of the players.
4.1 Formation with ¯xed hierarchical classes
In this section we model the formation of directed communication networks in case
the players are a priori partitioned in hierarchical classes. We will present a slight
modi¯cation of our general model of hierarchy formation. Generally, we will apply the
hierarchical value, discussed in section 3, as an allocation rule. We will show that in that
case the game is a weighted potential game.
Firstly, we need some additional notation. Let N be a set of players and B =
(B1; : : : ; Bm) an ordered partition of the set of players. For notational convenience let
B0 = Bm+1 = ;. Let ® > 1 be the weight that represents the relative strength of an




Furthermore, with (Si)i2N the strategy sets as in the hierarchy formation game, we de¯ne
for all Y =
Q
i2N Yi with Yi µ Si for all i 2 N ,
A(Y ) = fA(y) j y 2 Y g:
Not all classes of directed communication networks can be generated by our adjusted
model of hierarchy formation. Therefore, we make some assumptions on the class of
directed communication networks graphs we consider. Consider an ordered partition B
of the player set. Let A be a set of directed communication networks that satis¯es the
following conditions:
1. A is closed under taking inclusions.
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2. For all A 2 A and all (i; j) 2 A it holds that there exists k 2 f1; : : : ;m¡ 1g with
j 2 Bk and i 2 Bk+1.
3. There exist Yi µ Si = f(s1i ; s2i ) j s1i ; s2i µ Nnfig; s1i \ s2i = ;g for all i 2 N such
that A(Y ) = A.
The ¯rst condition is made throughout this paper. The second condition makes sure
that the graphs respect the ordered partition of the players. The last condition is made
to make sure that A is a set of graphs that can result in a hierarchy formation game. A
set A that satis¯es these conditions will be called a B-constrained closed set.
Some examples of classes of graphs that satisfy the conditions above are the class of
all graphs that respect the ordered player partition and the set of graphs in which every
player has at most one initiator in the class directly above his own class.
Now, the hierarchy formation game with ¯xed hierarchical classes ¡fc(N;B;A; r; °)
with N , B, and A as described above, r a reward function on A, and ° an allocation
rule on DRSN;A is the tuple (N ; (Xi)i2N ; (f
°





i ) j 9A 2 A : x1i = fj j (j; i) 2 Ag and x2i = fj j (i; j) 2 Ag
o
:
The payo® function is determined by
f°(x) = °(N; r; A(x)) for all x 2 X:
We remark that some work needs to be done to show that A(X) = A. This is
captured in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1 Let ¡fc(N;B;A; r; °) be a hierarchy formation game with ¯xed hierarchical
classes determined by the tuple (N ; (Xi)i2N ; (f
°
i )i2N). Then A(X) = A.
Proof: By de¯nition of X it follows directly that A(X) ¶ A. It remains to show
that A(X) µ A. Therefore, let Y = (Yi)i2N be such that A(Y ) = A. Such an Y
exists by condition 3 in the description of B-constrained closed sets. We will show that
A(X) µ A(Y ), which su±ces in order to show that A(X) = A. Let x 2 X. For every
i 2 N we have xi = (x1i ; x2i ) 2 Xi. Then, by de¯nition of Xi there exists A 2 A such
that
x1i = fj j (j; i) 2 Ag;
x2i = fj j (i; j) 2 Ag:
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Since A 2 A = A(Y ) there exists yi = (y1i ; y2i ) 2 Yi with
y1i ¶ x1i (7)
and
y2i ¶ x2i : (8)
Clearly, the pro¯le y = (yi)i2N satis¯es A(y) ¶ A(x). Since A(Y ) = A is closed, this
implies that A(X) µ A(Y ).
We conclude that A(X) = A. 2
We remark that relations (7) and (8) above imply that the strategies in Xi can be
seen as minimal strategies, not containing any announcements for forming a hierarchical
relation with a player that cannot form according to the collection of directed commu-
nication networks under consideration.
We will show that if the wB®-directed communication value is applied, then this game
is a weighted potential game. We will use that the wB®-directed communication value
satis¯es component e±ciency and ®-hierarchical fairness on DRSN;A which is implied by
the following lemma.
Lemma 4.2 Let B be an (ordered) partition of player set N , A a B-constrained closed
set of graphs, and ® > 1. Then the wB®-directed communication value coincides with the
®-hierarchical value on DRSN;A.
Proof: Lemma 3.3 shows that there is at most one allocation rule that satis¯es com-
ponent e±ciency and ®-directed fairness. Theorem 3.1 implies that the wB®-directed
communication value ±w
B
® satis¯es component e±ciency and wB®-fairness. We will show
that this implies that ±w
B
® satis¯es ®-directed fairness.


















Since (wB®)i = ®(w
B
®)j it follows that
±
wB®
i (N; r;A)¡ ±w
B
®




j (N; r;A)¡ ±w
B
®





® satis¯es ®-directed fairness.
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Theorem 3.4 completes the proof. 2
The following theorem states that if the wB®-directed communication value is applied,
then ¡fc(N;B;A; r; °) game is a weighted potential game.
Theorem 4.1 The hierarchy formation game ¡fc(N;B;A; r; ±wB® ) is a weighted potential
game.
Proof: Consider the following set of cooperative games, indexed by the set of strategy
pro¯les of ¡fc(±w
B
® ), f(N; vr;A(x))gx2X . Let R µ N and x = (xR; xNnR) 2 X. Com-
bining vr;A(x)(R) =
P
C2R=A(x) r((A(x))(C)) with the fact that R=A(x) and (A(x))(C)
for all C 2 R=A(x) do not depend on xNnR we ¯nd that vr;A(x)(R) does not depend
on xNnR. By (2) it follows that this implies that f(N; vA(x))gx2X 2 GN;X . Since
f ±
wB®
i (x) = ±
wB
i (A(x)) = ©
wB
i (v
r;A(x)) by de¯nition, it follows by theorem 2.1 that ¡fc(±w
B
® )
is a wB®-potential game. 2
Note that in view of lemma 4.2 we could reformulate theorem 4.1 in terms of the
®-hierarchical value rather than in terms of the ®-directed communication value.
4.2 Formation with endogenous hierarchical classes
In the previous subsection we have described a game that models the formation of di-
rected communication networks in case the players are a priori partitioned in hierarchical
classes. In this section we will not make this assumption. Again we are mainly interested
in models where we can apply the hierarchical value as developed in section 3.
The main di®erence with the models described so far, is that the players do not only
specify the sets of players they want to be a boss of and be a subordinate to, but also a
number that represents the hierarchical class they want to belong to.
Let N be a set of players, r a directed reward function on the set of all directed
communication networks on N that satisfy HCP, and ° an allocation rule for directed
reward situations. Then the hierarchy formation game without ¯xed hierarchical classes
¡nfc(N; r; °;m) with m · n is determined by the tuple (N ; (Si)i2N ; (f°i )i2N ), where for







i ) j s1i ; s2i µ Nnfig; s1i \ s2i = ;; s31 2 f1; : : : ;mg
o
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the set of players he wants to be a subordinate to (s1i ), the set of players he wants to
be a boss of (s2i ), and the hierarchical class player i wants to belong to (s
3
i ). We assume
that m · n, which represents a model without ¯xed hierarchical classes, but with a ¯xed
number of hierarchical classes. A strategy pro¯le s = (s1; : : : ; sn) 2
Q
i2N Si, induces a
set of directed links Anfc(s) given by
Anfc(s) =
©
(i; j) j i 2 s1j ; j 2 s2i ; s3i = s3j + 1
ª
:
The interpretation is that a directed link is formed if and only if both players involved
in the link are willing to form it and the player who wants to be receiver is in the
class directly below the class of the player that wants to be an initiator in this relation.
The payo® function f° = (f°i )i2N is then de¯ned as the allocation rule applied to the
hierarchy formed, i.e.,
f°(s) = °(N; r; Anfc(s)); for all s 2 S:
Consider the following 2-player example.
Example 4.2 Consider a situation with two players. These players can make joint
pro¯ts if they cooperate. Cooperation only occurs by means of directed communication
relations. Additionally, player 1 has more leading qualities than player 2. This results
if player 1 is boss and player 2 subordinate in a pro¯t equal to 1, and if player 2 is boss
and player 1 subordinate in a pro¯t equal to a 2 (0; 1).
We model this situation by means of a directed reward function. Let N = f1; 2g and





0 if A = ;;
1 if A = f(1; 2)g;
a if A = f(2; 1)g;
where a 2 (0; 1).
We want to study the formation of a directed communication network in this situa-
tion. Suppose the allocation rule that is agreed upon by the players is the ®-hierarchical
value. For illustrational purposes we set ® = 2, but a similar analysis can be given for
any ® > 1.
Consider ¡nfc(N; r; h®; 2) with ® = 2. The strategy sets of the players are
S1 = f(;; ;; 1); (;; f2g; 1); (f2g; ;; 1); (;; ;; 2); (f2g; ;; 2); (;; f2g; 2)g;
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S2 = f(;; ;; 1); (;; f1g; 1); (f1g; ;; 1); (;; ;; 2); (f1g; ;; 2); (;; f1g; 2)g:
If player 1 chooses his sixth strategy and player 2 his third strategy, then player 1 will be
boss and player 2 subordinate, and together they will receive 1. By ®-directed fairness
and component e±ciency it is easily seen that player 1 will receive 2
3
and player 2 will
receive 1
3
. Similarly, if player 2 chooses his sixth strategy and player 1 his third strategy




, respectively. All other strategy pro¯les result
in no cooperation and zero payo®s for both players. Hence, both players have only 2
undominated strategies. The payo®s for the players restricted to undominated strategies
for all players are denoted in ¯gure 1.
s2 = (f1g; ;; 1) t2 = (;; f1g; 2)
s1 = (f2g; ;; 1) 0, 0 a3 , 2a3
t1 = (;; f2g; 2) 23 , 13 0, 0
Figure 1: Part of the payo® matrix of ¡nfc(N; v; h®; 2) with ® = 2.
By considering the complete payo® matrix it can be shown that the game in strategic
form is not a (weighted) potential game. The game in strategic form described above
has multiple equilibria. For example, a strategy pro¯le representing that both players
do not want to form anything is a Nash equilibrium since two players are needed to
form a directed communication relation, so no player can form a link by unilaterally
deviating. If we restrict ourselves to undominated strategies then (s1; t2) and (t1; s2) are


















) is a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. Note that the
equilibrium in mixed strategies is payo® dominated by (t1; s2).
Apparently, for a 2 (1
2
; 1) selecting between the pure equilibria is not straightforward.
However, if a · 1
2
, then (s1; t2) would be natural to be selected since it is the unique
strong Nash equilibrium.
We conclude that in this example the formation of an e±cient hierarchical structure,
i.e., the hierarchical structure which highest total pro¯t, seems to form with certainty
only if the di®erence with the total pro¯ts that can be obtained in other directed com-
munication networks is su±ciently large. 3
The model considered in this subsection provides an endogenous explanation for the
division of players in di®erent hierarchical classes. Although a player pro¯ts more from
a directed communication relation if he is in a higher hierarchical class, not all players
will choose the highest hierarchical class. Note that no pro¯ts for any player can be
28
made if all players prefer the highest hierarchical class, since in that case no directed
communication relations result.
The example shows that it can be expected that the e±cient directed communication
network results only if the di®erence between the gains in this directed communication
network and other directed communication networks is su±ciently large. Whether this
results can be extended to more general settings should be the topic of further research.
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